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NOTES

The United States Guestworker
Program: The Need for Reform

ABSTRACT

Although often marginalized,guestworkers are an integral
part of the United States economy. In 2006 alone, the U.S.
government certified visas for 18,736 temporary workers. The
program expanded in subsequent years and continues to grow
each year. Despite its broad scope, huge impact on the labor
force, and the extensive existing legislation regarding it, the
guestworker program has permitted most employers of
guestworkers to eschew the regulations or find loopholes,
resulting in a system that is largely exploitative. Abuse of
workers begins in their home countries, intensifies during the
period of employment, and often continues even after
employment terminates. Workers frequently fail to earn enough
money to cover their basic needs while in the United States or to
repay the debts they incurred in order to travel to the United
States.
The U.S. guestworker program is structured in a way that
promotes abuse, exploitation, and injustice. It needs to be
amended. First and foremost, new legislation must enhance
guestworkers' access to justice by lifting current restraints on
federally funded lawyers and permitting aggrieved workers to
remain in the United States long enough to prosecute their
claims. Second, the law must hold U.S. employers liable for
abuses perpetuatedby those actingon their behalf. They cannot
hide behind willful blindness and disclaim responsibility for
their employees. Third, the Department of Labor (DOL) must
begin to adequately enforce the protections in place to prepare
employers for legislation enhancing their obligations to their
workers. Finally, the legislationmust alter the existing balance
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of power and create a way to ensure that employers fulfill their

contractualobligations.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Recently, immigration emerged in the national conscious with
1
the passage of SB-1070, Arizona's controversial immigration bill.
2
Although both the bill and the nationwide response focus almost
exclusively on undocumented immigrants, the immigration problem
extends much deeper. Concerns over illegal immigrants overshadow
the problems with existing programs and legal foreign workers and
visitors. Any type of comprehensive immigration reform must go
beyond the simple distinctions between legal and illegal, and
documented and undocumented. It must recognize that the system is
failing both groups. This Note addresses one group specifically:
workers lawfully in the United States on H-2 visas. This guestworker
program desperately needs reform.
The official guestworker program began in 1952,3 and in 2006,
4
the U.S. government certified visas for 18,736 temporary workers.
Despite the large number of workers certified yearly, both the public
and the government focus instead on curtailing the illegal workforce. 5
Promising comprehensive immigration reform in his 2007 State of the
Union Address, President Bush admonished foreign-born workers for
"sneak[ing] in" and emphasized the need to give employers a way to
ascertain the legal status of those they hire.6 The President did not
mention the appropriate avenue for legal workers. 7 He did not
address issues relevant to the protection of guestworkers or express

1.

See, e.g., Over One-Thousand March and Rally in Oregon Against Arizona

Law, CAUSA BLOG (May 29, 2010, 7:19 PM), http://causaoregon.blogspot.com/
2010/05/one-thousand-march-and-rally-in-oregon.html.
Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, 2010 Ariz.
2.
Sess. Laws 113.
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163.
3.
U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, FOREIGN LABOR CERT. DATA CTR., CASE DIscLOSURE
4.
DATA (2006), available at http://www.flcdatacenter.com/casedata.aspx (listing certified
H-2A and H-2B workers).
5.
See, e.g., President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 23,
2
2007), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/ 3/
AR2007012301075.html (discussing illegal immigration).
Id.
6.
See id. (discussing the need to "establish a legal and orderly path for
7.
foreign workers to enter [the United States]," but offering no details on the appropriate
avenue).
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concern over the program's failure to protect the rights of legal
guestworkers. 8
A brief description of the experiences of a few guestworkers
provides a framework for the program and its shortcomings. Carmelo
Fuentes, a guestworker in North Carolina, feared losing his job and
visa to a faster worker. He felt extreme pressure from his boss to
continue working and ignored signs of dehydration. He labored until
a heat stroke shut down his internal organs and caused severe brain
damage. 9 In Louisiana, a group of Mexican guestworkers, expecting
to work in Arkansas in forestry, arrived in the United States where
the crew leader immediately confiscated their passports and sent
them to Louisiana to pick sweet potatoes.10 They lived in an
abandoned two-story house with no heating or blankets, and they
were rarely paid." If they did receive a check, it was often as little as
$70 for an eighty-four hour workweek. 12 The crew leader demanded a
$1,600 bribe for the return of their passports.13 Unable to pay, the
workers fled, but are still working to recuperate their legal
documents.1 4
There are tomato pickers working in Immokalee, Florida who
pick two tons of tomatoes to earn $50 a day. 15 Grapefruit pickers
there climb twelve-to-eighteen foot high ladders stuck into soggy soil,
reach into the branches to twist fruit from its stem, and stuff it into a
pick sack that can weigh up to one hundred pounds, while often
earning as little as $56 a day. 16 Unlike those crossing the border
illegally, these people are nameless and faceless to the American
public. Migrant workers live silently in conditions that are often
horrifying.' 7 Undocumented workers remain silent because their
employer or supervisor can call immigration at any time and have
them deported.' 8
In contrast, documented guestworkers fear
immigration enforcement because the structure of the guestworker

See id. (discussing the enforcement of immigration laws "at the worksite"
8.
and suggesting the establishment of a "temporary worker program," while only
addressing the "need to resolve the status of illegal immigrants").

9.

Leah Beth Ward, Desperate Harvest: N.C. Growers' Trade in Foreign Farm

Workers Draws Scrutiny, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Oct. 30, 1999, at Al.
10.
S. POVERTY LAW CTR., CLOSE TO SLAVERY: GUESTWORKER PROGRAMS IN THE
UNITED STATES 38 (2007).
11.
Id.
12.
Id.
13.
Id.
14.
Id.

15.

John Bowe, NOBODIES; Does Slavery Exist in America?, NEW YORKER,

Apr. 21, 2003, at 106, 106.
16.
Id. at 106-07.
See id. at 106 (describing squalid living conditions).
17.
18.
See generally id. (describing guestworkers' distrust
officials).

of immigration
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program deprives them of the security a visa ostensibly grants.1 9
While it is hard to imagine U.S. citizens living similarly without
engendering public outrage and governmental response, thousands of
legal guestworkers do it every day. 20
Despite the frequency with which exploitation occurs, there have
been very few high-profile legal actions highlighting cases of
guestworker abuse. Various circumstances unique to foreign workers
Existing
make such cases extremely difficult to prosecute. 21
legislation creates disparity in bargaining power that is often
insurmountable, and guestworkers remain anonymous and
oppressed. This Note focuses on H-2A agricultural workers as they
face great obstacles under the current regulations. It examines the
various reasons guestworkers are poorly protected and proposes
several ways to improve their situation. Part II examines the history
of guestworkers in the United States and identifies patterns of abuse
deeply rooted in the program's history. Part III analyzes current
legislation and demonstrates its shortcomings. Part IV suggests
several potential ways to improve the program.
II. FROM BRACEROS TO H-2S: NEW NAME, SIMILAR PROBLEMS

A. History of the Guestworker Program
An understanding of the modern guestworker program and the
current approach of the United States towards foreign workers
The first Mexican
requires an examination of its history.
guestworkers arrived in the United States in 1917 in response to the
Immigration Act of 1917, which waived many immigration
requirements for temporary workers. 22 Within four years, more than
72,000 foreign workers lived and worked in the United States. 23 By

See Protecting U.S. and Guest Workers: The Recruitment and Employment
19.
of Temporary Foreign Labor: HearingBefore the H. Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 110th
Cong. 53-57 (2007) [hereinafter Hearing] (prepared statement of Jonathan P. Hiatt,
Gen. Counsel, AFL-CIO) (noting that a guestworker can easily lose his status by
leaving his job).
20.
Bowe, supra note 15, at 122-24 (discussing the apathetic response of
American companies who buy crops from guestworker employers).
See, e.g., Castellanos-Contreras v. Decatur Hotels, LLC, 576 F.3d 274, 284
21.
(5th Cir. 2009) (finding that the employer did not have knowledge of recruiter
practices, the court did not hold the employer liable for reimbursing recruiting fees);
Arriaga v. Fla. Pac. Farms, 305 F.3d 1228, 1232-34 (11th Cir. 2002) (describing the
legal status of wronged workers); Catalan v. Vermillion Ranch Ltd., No. 06-CV-01043WYD-MJW, 2007 WL 38135, at *1 (D. Colo. Jan. 4, 2007) (acknowledging the difficulty
of prosecuting these cases).
22.
Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, § 3, 39 Stat. 874, 877-78.
23.
Lauren Gilbert, Fields of Hope, Fields of Despair: Legisprudential and
HistoricPerspectives on the AgJobs Bill of 2003, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 417, 426 (2005).
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1930, the United States housed more than 300,000 legal Mexican
workers and as many as one million undocumented workers. 24
However, as the economy crashed during the Great Depression,
Mexican workers experienced backlash. 25 Between 1929 and 1932,
the United States sent 345,000 Mexican workers home. 26
After the Depression, the U.S. government re-welcomed Mexican
workers and quickly implemented the Bracero Program, which was a
series of bills and agreements with Mexico relaxing immigration
requirements for temporary workers. 27
Through a bilateral
agreement between Mexico and the United States, the program
brought Mexican workers to the United States to perform temporary
agricultural work and then return home. 28 The program permitted
up to 50,000 workers to enter each year and, as written, expired at
the end of World War II, if not earlier. 29 However, subsequent
bilateral treaties between the United States and Mexico extended the
program through 1964.3o Although many historians believe that the
Bracero Program was a response to wartime labor shortages, ample
evidence exists to support the proposition that farmers lobbied for the
system to avoid paying higher wages.31 A report by the Center for
Immigration Studies argues that because the New Deal programs
paid growers to plant less, "by the end of the 1930s [U.S.] farm
workers were more likely to be poor, homeless, and marginally
employed than ever before." 32 Thus, growers became accustomed to
"a great over-supply of workers," desired to continue paying low
wages, and lobbied hard for a bill that maintained the status quo. 33
24.
Kimi Jackson, Farmworkers, Nonimmigration Policy, Involuntary
Servitude, and a Look at the SheepherdingIndustry, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1271, 127475 (2000).
25.
Id. at 1275.
Id.
26.
27.
See Act of Apr. 29, 1943, Pub. L. No. 45, 57 Stat 70 (appropriating funds for
a guestworker program); see also Act of Aug. 9, 1946, ch. 934, 60 Stat. 969 (extending
the program through June 1947); Farm Labor Supply Appropriation Act of 1944, ch.
16, 58 Stat. 11 (allocating funds for the program).
28.
Alice J. Baker, Agricultural Guestworker Programsin the United States, 10
TEX. Hisp. J.L. & POL'Y 79, 84 (2004).
29.
Bryce W. Ashby, Indentured Guests-How the H-2A and H-2B Temporary
Guest Worker Programs Create the Conditions for Indentured Servitude and Why
Upfront Reimbursement for Guest Workers' Transportation, Visa, and Recruitment
Costs is the Solution, 38 U. MEM. L. REV. 893, 899 (2008).
30.
Id.
31.
Compare ERASMO GAMBOA, MEXICAN LABOR AND WORLD WAR II: BRACEROS
IN THE PACIFIc NORTHWEST, 1942-1947, at xiii (1990) (citing the labor shortage as the
catalyst for the bracero system), with Cindy Hahamovitch, The Politics of Labor
Scarcity: Expediency and the Birth of the Agricultural "Guestworkers"Program, CTR.
FOR IMMIGR. STUD. (Dec. 1999), http://www.cis.org/AgriculturalGuestWorkersProgramLaborScarcity (arguing that contemporary rumors of a labor shortage were politically
motivated fiction).
32.
Hahamovitch, supranote 31.
Id.
33.
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Employers recognized the desirability of workers that were
disposable, easily manipulated, and willing to work harder for less. 34
This attitude prevails today.
Citizens of the United States paid little attention to migrant
farmworkers until 1960 when Edward Murrow broadcasted Harvest
of Shame, a documentary detailing the plight of domestic
farmworkers, the abuses faced by foreign guestworkers, and the
injustices presented by the Bracero Program. 35 Regardless of the
motivation underlying the Bracero Program's adoption, widespread
agreement exists that the program resulted in rampant employer
abuses. 36 As summarized by Harry Anderson, guestworkers "worked
for whom they were told, at whatever tasks they were told, under
whatever wages and working conditions ... and when they were no

longer wanted, they were shipped back to Mexico."3 7
In 1952, Congress encompassed the Bracero Program into the H2 visa, which was a program within the new Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA).3 8 The INA made the visas available to all
foreign workers, not just Mexican workers, and it provided a legal
avenue for both agricultural and non-agricultural temporary workers
to enter the United States.3 9 The new, more stringent program
authorized the Secretary of Labor (Secretary) to approve visas only
upon a showing that no qualified domestic worker was available and
that the employment of the guestworkers would not affect wages or
working conditions of domestic workers. 40 The H-2 program also
required employers to provide guestworkers with adequate housing
and pay the Adverse Effect Wage Rate (AEWR).41 The AEWR is
determined by the Department of Labor (DOL) and represents the
lowest wage that can be paid to a guestworker without having a
negative impact on the domestic work force. 42 The H-2 program was
underutilized for twenty years, but the limited historical record is full
of instances of abuse as growers preferred guestworkers, not

Id.
34.
See CBS Reports: Harvest of Shame (CBS television broadcast Nov. 26,
35.
1960).
See, e.g., S. POVERTY LAW CTR., supra note 10, at 2.
36.
HENRY P. ANDERSON, THE BRACERO SYSTEM IN CALIFORNIA, at intro. (Arno
37.
Press 1976) (1961).
38.
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414,
§ 101(a)(15)(H)(ii), 66 Stat. 163, 168 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii) (2006)).
See id. (making no distinctions with regard to national origin or type of
39.
labor).
40.
Id. § 1188(a)(1).
20 C.F.R. § 655.120 (2010) (Adverse Effect Wage Rate); id. § 655.122(d)
41.
(housing).
Id. § 655.103(b) (defining Adverse Effect Wage Rate); see, e.g., Notice of
42.
Adverse Effect Wage Rates (AEWRs), 72 Fed. Reg. 7909 (2007) (setting Adverse Effect
Wage Rates for 2007).
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necessarily because they were cheaper, but because of their
vulnerability and the growers ability to wield "absolute control" over
them. 4 3 Moreover, employers routinely ignored the housing and wage
requirements that the program mandated.44 Faced with growing
public opposition, pressure from labor unions, and concerns of civil
rights groups, Congress promulgated stricter immigration
requirements with the Immigration Act of 1965.45
B. The Current System
In 1986, Congress divided the guestworker program into two
parts: the H-2A program regulating agricultural workers and the H2B program regulating non-agricultural workers. 46 The statute
purported to divide the classes of workers in response to the DOL's
"experience with employer abuse of migrant and seasonal agricultural
workers."47 The DOL thought the division was necessary based on an
erroneous belief that H-2A workers had fewer skills and less
education, making them more dependent on contractual protections.48
To qualify for an H-2A visa, a worker had to prove residence in a
foreign country, their intention to return to that country, and an
agreement that their presence in the United States would be only "to
perform agricultural labor or services, as defined by the Secretary of
Labor."49
Twenty C.F.R. § 655 governs the H-2A program labor
certification process 50 and the Secretary makes the final decision
whether to grant the H-2A or not. The regulation's articulated
purpose is to provide the Secretary with sufficient information to
determine the following prior to granting any H-2A visa:
(a) [Whether there are sufficient able, willing, and qualified United
States ... workers available to perform the temporary and seasonal
agricultural employment for which an employer desires to import
nonimmigrant foreign workers (H-2A workers); and

43.
Jackson, supra note 24, at 1277.
Id.
44.
45.
Immigration Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 201, 79 Stat. 911, 911.
46.
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 301(a),
100 Stat. 3359, 3411 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a)-(b) (2006)).
47.
See Martinez v. Reich, 934 F. Supp. 232, 237 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (explaining
the DOL's rationale for separating agricultural and non-agricultural workers).
48.
See id. (noting that the DOL "issued separate procedures for agricultural
workers because of its experience with employer abuse of migrant and seasonal
agricultural workers").
49.
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a).
50.
See generally 20 C.F.R. § 655 (2010) (regulating the entire H-2 program).
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(b) Whether the employment of H-2A workers will adversely affect the
wages and working conditions of workers in the U.S. similarly
employed. 5 1

Under the INA and accompanying regulations, the Secretary may not
certify workers unless both conditions are met.5 2 The Secretary is
responsible for setting the AEWR, that is the minimum wage that the
DOL determines is necessary to ensure that the wages of similarly
situated domestic workers will not be harmed by the presence of the
foreign workers.5 3
The DOL designed the regulation to give
preference to and protect domestic jobs by ensuring employers do not
underpay guestworkers.5 4 The language of the preamble reflects the
position that permeates the INA: foreign laborers are less valuable
than domestic workers, and employers should only hire them when no
other workers are available.5 5
The statute and its implementing regulations impose additional
restrictions on the Secretary's ability to certify H-2 visas. The
Secretary cannot certify workers if (1) the labor shortage is due to a
strike or lockout; (2) the grower violated a term of a past certification
during the previous two years; (3) the grower failed to assure the
Secretary that it would provide workers' compensation insurance; or
(4) the grower did not make efforts to recruit U.S. workers. 56 If the
conditions are met, certification will be issued "no later than thirty
calendar days before the date of need" for labor.57 Further, employers
must attempt to recruit U.S. workers by offering a contract meeting
the jurisdiction's wage and benefits standards or the standard offered
to the guestworker, whichever is higher.5 8 Employers must file the
H-2A application and the specifics of the job offer, including the terms
and conditions, at least forty-five days before workers are needed. 59
Additionally, the employers must file a copy of the offer with the
employment service industry. 60 This verifies that the employer
complied with the DOL standards. If the employer fails to file fortyfive days in advance, the Employment and Training Administration

51.
Id. § 655.100.
52.
Id. § 655.0.
53.
See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
54.
See § 655.0(a)(3) ('This.. . subpart[] shall be construed to effectuate the
purpose of the INA that U.S. workers rather than aliens be employed wherever
possible.").
See id.
55.
56.
Id. § 655.122(e) (workers' compensation); id. § 655.135(b)-(c) (strike and
recruiting); id. § 655.182 (previous violations).
57.
Id. § 655.160.
See id. § 655.120 (requiring the employer to pay the highest of several
58.
standard wages).
59.
Id. § 655.130(b).
60.
Id. § 655.130(a).
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(ETA) of the DOL must deny the certification due to insufficient time
to investigate whether there is an available domestic workforce. 61
After filing with the ETA, the regulations require that both the
employer and the state agency begin to recruit domestic workers. 62
In cases of emergency, the ETA may waive the forty-five day
requirement.6 3 The regulation provides only the malleable standard
of "good and substantial cause" to help the ETA determine what
constitutes an emergency sufficient to permit a waiver. 64 Otherwise,
if the employer complies with the regulations governing certification,
the ETA decides whether to grant or deny the application thirty days
before the date for which the employer requested the workers. 65
To comply with the regulations, the job offer, at a minimum,
must include provisions setting a wage higher than or equivalent to
minimum wage, must provide for working conditions in compliance
with relevant Occupational Health and Safety Administration
[OSHA] standards, and must give workers' compensation insurance. 66
After the worker completes 50 percent of the contract, the statute
requires that the employer reimburse the guestworker for
"transportation and daily subsistence" costs incurred between their
home country and the farm. 67 However, H-2A workers are not
guaranteed all of the contractual protections of domestic workers.
The statute only requires employers to guarantee employment for
three-fourths of the total contract period. 6 8 Once the workers arrive
in the United States, they are tied to the employer for whom the visa
was procured. 69 If they wish to leave that grower for any reason,
including abuse, they lose their visa and must return directly to their
country of origin, even though they may only receive three-fourths of
their promised contract.
III. REALITIES OF THE PROGRAM
Although the regulations and statutory provisions were designed
to safeguard the rights of guestworkers, they are poorly enforced,
enforced inconsistently, or, simply by their plain language, demand
enforcement that benefits employers at the expense of guestworkers.
The exploitation begins at home, with corrupt recruiters charging
61.
denial).
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.

§ 655.161(a)

(listing failure to comply with

Id. § 655.143.
Id. § 655.134.
Id.
Id. § 655.160.
Id. § 655.122(d)-(e).
Id. § 655.122(h)(1).
Id. § 655.122(i).
S. POVERTY LAW CTR., supra note 10, at 41.

§ 655.130(b)

as a ground for
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high fees for jobs in the United States.7o When the workers arrive in
the United States, the abuse intensifies. Foreign workers legally in
the United States are extremely vulnerable and often fail to receive
basic legal protections. Guestworkers are isolated geographically,
linguistically, and socially from the rest of the U.S. population. 7 '
After abuse occurs, the guestworkers rarely seek a legal remedy, and
those that do have extremely limited access to legal resources. 72 Few
private lawyers are willing to take these cases, and most legal aid
services affordable to guestworkers are federally funded Legal Service
Corporations (LSCs) and subject to many constraints. 73 Despite
facing breaches of contract, inhumane working conditions, and crimes
amounting to human trafficking, workers are unable to consistently
or meaningfully gain access to the American legal system to vindicate
their rights or police the guestworker system. 74
Some government officials recognize the need for change.
Speaking to the House Committee on Education and Labor in 2007,
Representative and Chairman Charles Rangel declared that the
practices of many employers "not only undermine living standards;
they ruin lives." Rangel described the program generally as "the
closest thing we have in this country to modern day slavery or
indentured servitude."75
The report issued by the Committee
recommended reworking the statute to improve conditions and
prevent the worst forms of exploitation. 76 Despite widely documented
cases of abuse at all stages of the guestworker experience, three years
later, the laws remain the same, the enforcement remains
inconsistent, and guestworkers remain vulnerable to exploitation.

70.
Hearing, supra note 19, at 53 (prepared statement of Jonathan P. Hiatt,
Gen. Counsel, AFL-CIO).
71.
See Ashby, supra note 29, at 920 (noting linguistic isolation of
guestworkers).
72.
S. POVERTY LAW CTR., supra note 10, at 2.
73.
See id. at 30-31 (noting the inability of LSC attorneys to participate in
class actions).

74.

Id.

75.
Hearing, supra note 19, at 3 (statement of Rep. George Miller, Chairman,
H. Comm. on Educ. and Labor).
76.
See id. at 22-23 (statement of Baldemar Valasquez, Founder and
President, Farm Labor Org. Comm.).
[RIemove the prospects for any money changing hands in Mexico.... [M]ak[e]
the employer jointly liable for a recruiter's action . . .. [A] worker should be
afforded the same labor rights as any other worker. ... [A] worker should be
allowed to obtain a temporary residence or at least to adjust a visa where he
will not have to repeat an application process.

Id.
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A. Paying to Get Here
Problems first surface in the guestworkers' native country.
While employers navigate the system guided by the DOL,
guestworkers are generally embroiled in a much more complicated
process at home. Just to be considered for an H-2 position, foreign
nationals pay exorbitant amounts to local recruiters who are often
hired by the U.S. employers themselves. 7 7 Nearly all H-2 employers
procure workers through these local recruiters.78 Unfortunately, "[i]n
exchange for thousands of dollars in fees, unscrupulous labor
recruiters lure workers to the United States by promising them good
jobs and a better life."79 These recruiters make money charging
potential workers exorbitant fees, sometimes in the thousands of
dollars, in exchange for placing the worker's name on the H-2
roster.8 0 The fees sometimes cover travel to the United States and
the price of the visa, but always leave a large profit for the
recruiter.81 Most prospective workers must borrow funds and many
take on high-interest loans to pay this fee. 82 Moreover, some
recruiters require the workers to leave collateral, such as the deed to
their land, to ensure compliance with the labor contract.83 The
workers then lose the deed to their land if they do not complete the
contract. 84 Therefore, guestworkers have a very strong incentive to
continue working despite horrible conditions.
On average, workers arrive to work a low-paying farm job in the
United States with debt up to $10,000, and it is extremely difficult to
repay their debt performing the work their visa authorizes.8 5 For
example, Guatemalan guestworkers represented by the Southern
Poverty Law Center paid $2,000 in fees prior to arriving in the
United States. 86 Similarly, workers arriving at the Decatur Hotel in
Louisiana paid between $3,500 and $5,000 in fees to local recruiters

E.g., Arriaga v. Fla. Pac. Farms, 305 F.3d 1228, 1244-45 (11th Cir. 2002)
77.
(describing recruitment fees).
S. POVERTY LAW CTR., supra note 10, at 9-12.
78.
79.
Hearing, supra note 19, at 2 (statement of Rep. George Miller, Chairman,
H. Comm. on Educ. and Labor).
Id. at 11-12 (prepared statement of Mary Bauer, Dir., Immigrant Justice
80.
Project, S. Poverty Law Ctr.).
See generally id. (discussing recruitment programs and collection of fees in
81.
excess of potential wages).
Id. at 12 (prepared statement of Mary Bauer, Dir., Immigrant Justice
82.
Project, S. Poverty Law Ctr.).
See De Leon-Granados v. Eller & Sons, Inc., 497 F.3d 1214, 1217 (11th Cir.
83.
2007) (discussing recruitment abuses).
See id. (stating that some guestworkers were required to post collateral in
84.
order to gain employment).
S. POVERTY LAW CTR., supra note 10, at 9.
85.
86.
Id. at 10.
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and soon discovered they did not earn enough money to survive, let
alone pay off the debt.8 7 The Decatur workers sought help through
the court system, but the Fifth Circuit found that employers were not
liable for the expenses workers incurred prior to their arrival.88 The
laws create a system in which workers are completely dependent on
employers, desperate for work, and scraping by to survive and pay off
their debts. Such situations are not the exception, but the norm in
the H-2A program.8 9
There is a two-way circuit split over whether or not employers
are responsible for repaying workers the cost of pre-employment
expenses, such as transportation, visa costs, and recruitment fees. 90
In any event, growers employing H-2A workers must pay them at
least minimum wage, as set by the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA). 91 However, the FLSA has a major loophole: it permits
employers to pay wages "in cash or facilities," deducting wages for
costs such as room and board. 92 The rate deducted for such facilities
must be reasonable, and nothing can be deducted for facilities that
are "primarily for the benefit or convenience of the employer."93
Regulations specify several facilities considered to be for the benefit
of the employer, including equipment for the job and transportation
"incident and necessary to the employment." 94 Additionally, such
costs cannot "cut[] into the minimum wage or overtime wages
required to be paid" under the FLSA.9 5 Whether or not employers
must pay for high debts incurred in foreign workers' home countries
depends on whether a court or Congress determines that such costs
are primarily for the benefit or convenience of the employer. 96
Consequently, the interpretation of the phrase, "for the benefit of the
employer," is hugely important for a worker struggling to break even.

87.
Brief of Appellee-Respondent at 8-10, Castellanos-Contreras v. Decatur
Hotels, LLC, 576 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 2008) (No. 07-30942).
88.
Castellanos-Contreras,576 F.3d at 284.
89.
See S. POVERTY LAW CTR., supra note 10, at 2.
90.
Compare Castellanos-Contreras,576 F.3d at 284 (holding that the employer
"incurred no FLSA liability to reimburse its guest workers for the recruitment fees,
transportation costs, or visas fees that they incurred to work in the United States"),
with Arriaga v. Fla. Pac. Farms, 305 F.3d 1228, 1237 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding
employers liable for many of the pre-employment expenses incurred "primarily for the
benefit of the employer").
91.
29 C.F.R. § 531.27 (2010).
92.
Id.
93.
Id. § 531.3(d)(1).
94.
Id. § 531.3 (tools); id. §531.32 (transportation).
95.
Id. § 531.35.
96.
See Arriaga, 305 F.3d at 1244-46 (emphasizing the importance of the
classification of the cost).
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B. Policingthe Recruitment ProcessIs Impossible
Under the Current Law
Failing to give H-2A workers statutory protections during
recruitment leads to many abuses, yet the recruitment process is
entirely unregulated. 97 Employers hide behind the shield of foreign
relations, denying responsibility for abuse occurring outside of the
United States that is "directly related to the workers' employment in
the U.S. and affects workers' ability to assert their rights to basic fair
treatment in the U.S."9 8 Portions of the Migrant and Seasonal
Agricultural Protection Act (MSPA) govern recruitment practices, but
the statute excludes H-2A agricultural workers from its protections,
forcing the workers to rely solely on their contracts for protection."
The MSPA requires all recruiters of domestic farm workers to
disclose basic information to potential employees, including the place
of employment, wage rate, the crops and kinds of activities in which
the worker may be employed, the period of employment,
transportation, any deductions from pay, the existence of any past or
present labor disputes, any connection between the recruiter and the
employer, and the availability of workers' compensation insurance.1 00
The MSPA grants a federal cause of action to workers overcharged
and misled by recruiters or employers and authorizes the payment of
damages.' 0 Unfortunately, it is limited to U.S. citizens and H-2B
workers. H-2A workers, protected only by their contract, do not have
guarantees against unscrupulous recruitment practices.1 02
Recruiters enter into relationships with U.S. farmers and agree
to compile the list of workers who will receive visas. This control over
jobs, which is perceived as desirable, gives recruiters an extreme
amount of power; it is common for recruiters to use this power to
charge high rates for visa interviews, visas, transportation, and
miscellaneous fees.' 0 3 The U.S. employer never receives money from
the recruitment system and the law does not hold employers
responsible for foreign recruitment, so the employers have no
incentive to demand change.104 The lack of enforcement has created

97.
S. POVERTY LAW CTR., supra note 10, at 9-10.
98.
Hearing, supra note 19, at 15 (prepared statement of Mary Bauer, Dir.,
Immigrant Justice Project, S. Poverty Law Ctr.).
99.
See Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act § 3, 29
U.S.C. § 1802(8)(B)(ii) (2006) (excluding temporary guestworkers from its protections).
100.
Id. § 1821.
101.
Id. § 1854.
102.
See 20 C.F.R. § 655.122 (2010) (listing protections for H-2A workers).
103.
Hearing, supra note 19, at 22 (statement of Baldemar Velasquez, Founder
and President, Farm Labor Org. Comm.).
104.
See S. POVERTY LAW CTR., supra note 10, at 13-14 (arguing for the
extension of employer liability through a ban on recruitment fees).
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a market for the sale of H-2A visas, and recruiters in workers' home
countries are simply selling H-2A visas to the highest bidder. 0 5 It is
difficult to directly enforce U.S. law against the recruiters but,
because the MSPA does not cover H-2A workers, employers are not
subject to penalties for poor recruitment policies either. The law
holds no one accountable for this form of abuse.
The recruiters' role does not end when the guestworkers leave
their home country. Workers arrive in the United States, find that
the recruiters misled them, "but by then they are deeply in debt and
without options."' 0 6 Many left collateral, such as the deed to their
land, with the recruiter and virtually all have borrowed enormous
sums of money at extremely high interests rates. 0 7 Others fear for
their families and homes, owe money to recruiters that frighten them,
and are terrified at the prospect of failing to earn enough money to
pay their debts. 0 8
When workers violate their contracts, as
determined by the recruiters, recruiters punish them, charging as
much as $1,000 to get their deed back or increasing the interest rate
on the loan.' 0 9 Such behavior deters many workers from complaining
about being misled or leaving bad jobs.1 0 Workers stay on farms
even when no work is available and they are not paid, for fear of the
recruiter awaiting them at home."'
Prosecuting recruiters for breach of contract or fraud is an
untenable and costly solution that the government has not
employed.11 2 Without the protections of the MSPA, H-2A workers
end up trapped in terrible jobs in the United States. They need to
pay their debts and ensure that recruiters return the collateral
provided.
Employers in the United States are currently not
responsible for the actions of the recruiters even though recruiting
foreign labor through this system is their own choice."i 3 The cycle of
disempowerment begins at recruitment and continues throughout the
entire H-2A experience.114
However, the H-2A regulations are not completely silent on
recruitment.
The program requires employers to provide job
105.
See id. (discussing the high costs of visas).
106.
Hearing,supra note 19, at 10 (prepared statement of Ray Marshall, Former
U.S. Sec'y of Labor, President Emeritus, LBJ Sch. of Pub. Affairs, Univ. of Tex.).

107.

Id.

108.
S. POVERTY LAW CTR., supra note 10, at 9-12.
109.
See id. (detailing how recruiters levy fines arbitrarily in order to control
laborers).
110.
Id. at 11.
111.
See id. (describing workers' fear of recruiters).
112.
See id. at 14 ("It is hard to imagine enforcing such a rule.").
113.
See id. at 42 (describing how proposed legislation would make employers
responsible for actions of their recruiters).
114.
See Hearing, supra note 19, at 22 (statement of Baldemar Valasquez,
Founder and President, Farm Labor Org. Comm.) ("[W]e have processed more than
4,000 inquiries, grievances and irregularities over the past 2 years.").
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information to workers in a job offer during recruitment, and failure
to comply with the disclosed job description means employers may not
be recertified. 1 5 However, the few employers questioned about
recruitment processes claim ignorance and successfully push the
blame onto foreign recruiters, thus avoiding DOL sanctions. 116
Compounding the problem, DOL enforcement actions are generally
Between 1974 and 2004, the number of DOL
declining.
investigations of labor complaints declined by 14 percent, while the
number of workers covered by the FLSA more than doubled.11 7 In
2004, the DOL investigated only eighty-nine of over six thousand H2A employers." 8 In 1997, the Government Accountability Office
reported that the DOL never declined an application for H-2A
workers because of an employer's past violations of the legal rights of
workers.119 Further, no independent cause of action exists under the
INA and workers cannot be compensated based on violations of H-2A
regulations. Guestworkers can only litigate breach of contract claims
or violations of the FLSA and hope the DOL initiates an investigation
to prevent the employer from continuing in the H-2A program.120
However, when the DOL investigates, its actions are only prospective
and do not compensate the aggrieved guestworkers.
C. The Structure of the ProgramAllows Abuse
The H-2A program ties workers to a single employer and that
employer shapes the worker's experience in the United States.121 To
comply with the statute, the DOL must only certify farmers
complying with the terms of employment as defined by 20 C.F.R.

See 20 C.F.R. § 655.182 (2010) (describing consequences of violating
115.
regulations).
See Hearing, supra note 19, at 11 (statement of Mary Bauer, Dir.,
116.
Immigrant Justice Project, S. Poverty L. Ctr.) (describing as a crucial first step a bill
that "regulatets] recruitment costs, and ... make[s] employers responsible for the
recruiters that they choose").
Lack of Government Enforcement, S. POVERTY LAW CTR. (Apr. 2007),
117.
http://www.splcenter.org/legal/ guestreport/guest8.jsp.
118.
See Hearing,supra note 19, at 14 (prepared statement of Mary Bauer, Dir.,
Immigrant Justice Project, S. Poverty L. Ctr.) (noting that in 2007, there were over
6,700 employers using H-2A workers).
Lack of Government Enforcement, supra note 117.
119.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1188(b)(2)(A) (2006) (disqualifying employers who have
120.
violated the terms of the program within the past two years from employing
guestworkers). However, an employer can only be barred from participation for three
years. § 1188(b)(2)(B).
See id. § 1188(a) (outlining the requirements an employer must meet to
121.
qualify for guestworker labor); see also id. § 1188(d)(2) (allowing transfer to another
employer if the guestworker was brought in by a trade association of which both
employers are members).
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§ 655.122 Certification requires that employers guarantee that they
will meet the housing requirements, employment terms, benefits, and
other provisions of the regulations. The regulation charges the DOL
to exercise due diligence in assuring that the employer is not
engaging in fraud or willful misrepresentation with regards to any of
the material elements of the employment agreement.12 3
The implementing regulation requires the administrator of the
Office of Foreign Labor Certification (OFLC), located within the wage
and hour division of the DOL, to investigate employers and assure
that they do not violate any of the program's requirements.124 If the
OFLC administrator determines that an employer violated any
material term or condition of the temporary alien labor certification
during a two-year period after approval, the administrator must
investigate.1 25 Per the regulation, if the violation is substantial, the
employer may not receive guestworker certification for one year. If
the farmer is a repeat violator, the DOL may suspend the employer
from the program, subject to the discretion of the OFLC
administrator.12 6 If the OFLC administrator determines that the
violations are not substantial, he may require conformity to special
procedures during the subsequent labor certification process, but
cannot require the employer to offer higher wages, better working
conditions, or greater benefits than those specified by § 655.122.127 In
the abstract, the regulations in place seem sufficient; in reality, they
are ineffectual. 28
1.

Wage and Hour Abuses Are Rampant

The rationale for not extending the protections of the MSPA to
H-2A workers is based on contract theory. Under this theory, H-2A
workers, like domestic workers, are adequately protected by their
contracts, which provide the terms of employment as required under
the statute, and by the FLSA, which requires employers to pay at

122.
See 20 C.F.R. § 655.122 (2010) (outlining the requirements for H-2A job
offers).
123.
See id. § 655.184 (authorizing DOL officials to investigate potential
violations and refer the investigation to the Department of Homeland Security for
sanctions).
124.
See generally id. § 655 (outlining the pertinent rules regarding
guestworkers).
125.
See id. § 655.182 (authorizing the OFLC to investigate violations within a
two-year statute of limitations).
126.
Id. § 655.182(a). "No employer, attorney, or agent may be debarred under
this subpart for more than 3 years from the date of the final agency decision." Id.
§ 655.182(c)(2).
127.
Id. § 655.183. The regulation does not provide a definition of substantial
violation, leaving the interpretation to the discretion of the administrator.
128.
See Hearing,supra note 19, at 14 (prepared statement of Mary Bauer, Dir.,
Immigrant Justice Project, S. Poverty Law Ctr.) (noting lack of enforcement).
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least minimum wage.1 29 In practice, the DOL does not effectively
police wage and hour contract abuses and not every breach of contract
is severe enough to reach the level of an FLSA violation.o30 For
example, in Zamora v. Shores and Ruark Seafood, Inc. guestworkers
brought suit alleging wage and hour abuse against an employer that
had been cited two times by the DOL for failure to pay minimum
Despite
wages and overtime wages to his employers. 131
overwhelming evidence of repeated breach of contract, the DOL
merely fined the company and recertified it to receive workers the
following year.132 The OFLC administrator did not find it necessary
or appropriate to cut off the employer's access to workers.' 3 3
The statute itself requires employers to provide only threefourths of the wages and hours promised in the contract.1 34 Although
this is in the H-2A contracts, workers expect more and act
accordingly, so the very structure of the program puts them at risk
for not recouping their costs. Many H-2A employers request workers
for far more work than they have available, 35 just in case they need
them. As long as the workers receive three-fourths of the promised
pay, the employers are not liable.' 3 6
According to the Brennan Center for Justice, "trends indicate a
significant reduction in the government's capacity to ensure that
employers are complying with the most basic workplace laws."137 Of
the thousands of H-2A workers interviewed for the Southern Poverty
Law Center report, most reported working between eight and twelve
hours per day, six days a week without receiving overtime. 3 8
Workers routinely reported that employers required them to purchase
their own work-related tools, the expense of which unlawfully drove
wages below the minimum wage level required by the FLSA.1 39
Allowing an industry to rely largely on a very vulnerable workforce
leads to a "race to the bottom in terms of wages to be paid," a race

129.
See 29 C.F.R. § 531.27 (2010) (prescribing the acceptable means of paying
the minimum wage).
130.
See S. POVERTY LAW CTR., supra note 10, at 22-24 (noting various simple
methods employers can use to underpay workers with impunity).
131.
Id. at 20 (citing Zamora v. Shores & Ruark Seafood, Inc., No. C98CV:501
(E.D. Va.)).
132.
Id.
See id.; 20 C.F.R. § 655.182(a) (2010) ('The OFLC Administrator may debar
133.
an employer or any successor in interest to that employer from receiving
certifications ... if the OFLC Administrator finds that the employer substantially
violated a material term or condition of its temporary labor certification . .

134.
135.
need).
136.
137.
138.
139.

S. POVERTY LAW CTR., supra note 10, at 22.
See id. (noting that employers commonly overstate the hours of work they
20 C.F.R. § 655.122(i).
S. POVERTY LAW CTR., supra note 10, at 28.
Id. at 18-19.
Id. at 19.
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which hurts both the exploited workers and those employers who
desire to comply with the law.140
Although the guestworker scheme is designed to permit
documented immigrants to work in the United States, the structure
of the program actually may increase the number of workers illegally
working off-visa in the United States, as many attempt to recoup
costs with alternate employers. 14 1 This reality is antithetical to the
very purpose of the guestworker program. 142 When workers do not
receive the hours promised under their contract, workers do not earn
enough to cover costs. Their visas are not yet expired but become
technically invalid as soon as they leave the employer that originally
hired them.14 3 Guestworkers must make the difficult choice between
obeying the rules of the program and avoiding the risk of immigration
consequences by returning immediately to their home country, or
working illegally until their visa expires or they have covered costS. 144
2.

The Program's Structure Leads to an Imbalance in Bargaining
Power Between the Employer and the Guestworker

As previously mentioned, guestworkers have little power to force
their employers to fulfill their contracts. Both the INA and the H-2A
program's implementing regulations bind guestworkers to one job and
employer. Working for another employer violates the terms of the
visa and puts guestworkers out of legal status and at risk for
deportation and a subsequent immigration bar. 145 Additionally, if the
employer fires the worker for any reason at all, the worker loses his
legal status. 146 The employer holds a very powerful "deportation
card." 14 7 Employers also seize documents to wield even greater
control over workers' mobility and ability to challenge conditions. 148
Such threats of deportation and seizure of documents are common in
the H-2A context: "One of the most chronic abuses reported by

140.
Id. at 20.
141.
See id. at 13 (noting that many employers even encourage guestworkers to
seek other jobs, for which they are not legally documented).
142.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1188 (2006) (limiting availability of H-2A workers to
employers who need them because they cannot find workers otherwise).
143.
8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(5)(viii)(C) (2010) ("[An alien's stay as an H-2A
nonimmigrant is limited by the term of an approved petition."); see also 20 C.F.R.
§ 655.135(i)(1) (2010) (requiring employers to inform H-2A workers that they cannot
remain in the United States once their employment has ended).
See S. POVERTY LAW CTR., supra note 10, at 13 (describing one worker's
144.
decision to stay in the United States to work other jobs once his visa expired).
145.
Id. at 1.
See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
146.
S. POVERTY LAW CTR., supra note 10, at 15.
147.
See id. at 15-16 (describing employer's confiscation of guestworker's
148.
passport).
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guestworkers concerns the seizure of identity documents-in
particular passports and social security cards."1 49
When workers leave a bad job or complain, there are
repercussions. In 2000, Human Rights Watch, reporting on North
Carolina H-2A employers, found "widespread fear and evidence of
blacklisting against workers who speak up about conditions, who seek
assistance from Legal Services attorneys, or who become active in the
[union]."15o Workers fear that if they complain about conditions, they
may lose their jobs or not be hired by U.S. employers in the future.
Such fears are not without basis. The North Carolina Growers
Association actually keeps a "blacklist," consisting of names of over
one thousand "undesirable" former guestworkers. 15 1 The conclusion
drawn by Mary Bauer, of Southern Poverty Law Center, presenting
in front of the House Commission on Labor was that "[w]orkers live in
constant fear that any bad act or complaint on their part will result in
their being sent home or not being rehired . . . [flear of retaliation is a

deeply rooted problem in guestworker programs."152 As explored
below, the powerlessness of most guestworkers traps them in
situations often amounting to involuntary servitude.1 53
3.

Forced Labor

The U.S. Criminal Code, 18 U.S.C. § 1589,154 makes it a crime to
obtain the labor or services of a person:
1. By means of force, threats of force, physical restraint, or
threats of physical restraint to that person or another
person;
2.

By means of serious harm or threats of serious harm to,
that person or another person;

3.

By means of abuse or threatened abuse of law or legal
process; or

4. By means of any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to
cause the person to believe that, if the person did not

149.

Id. at 15.

150.
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, UNFAIR ADVANTAGE: WORKERS' FREEDOM OF
ASSOCIATION IN THE UNITED STATES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
STANDARDS 202 (2000).
151.
S. POVERTY LAW CTR., supra note 10, at 17.

152.
Hearing, supra note 19, at 13 (prepared statement of Mary Bauer, Dir.,
Immigrant Justice Project, S. Poverty Law Ctr.).
153.
See S. POVERTY LAw CTR., supra note 10, at 2 (noting guestworkers are
"held virtually captive").
154.
18 U.S.C. § 1589 (2006).
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perform such labor or services, that person or another
person would suffer serious harm or physical restraint.155
Any person working under such conditions is a victim of forced
labor and has a private cause of action under 18 U.S.C. § 1595.156 As
discussed above, the treatment endured by many guestworkers
amounts to violations of this provision.1 5 7 Recruiters routinely
threaten workers or their families if they leave their jobs, many
workers are forced to relinquish their passports upon arrival, and
threats of deportation are common.15 8 In the context of guestworkers,
the most common violation of the trafficking statute involves the
seizure of documents.159 To establish document servitude, a violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1592(a) and § 1589(c), a guestworker must prove that
the employer or contractor seized the passports in violation of or in an
attempt to violate the laws against trafficking. 160 Often, it is the
recruiters that violate this section. 161 The structure of the H-2A
program, as it exists in practice, insulates employers from claims of
forced labor and trafficking. Recruiters, the perpetrators of many of
the violations, are generally located in foreign countries and thus
difficult to prosecute.
Many U.S. employers further distance themselves from liability
by employing workers hired by farm labor contractors. 162 The DOL
certifies farm labor contractors, who are generally from the same
country as the guestworker, to apply for certification to host H-2
workers.163 The DOL certifies them, despite the fact that it is
impossible for farm labor contractors to comply with the regulations.
The contractors have no actual work available and plan to loan the
workers to other farmers for a fee.164 There is no way for farm labor
contractors to show a shortage of U.S. workers or the effect on wages,
as there is no job available at the time of hiring. If an employer pays
a farm labor contractor to use H-2 workers, any failure to pay is a
breach of the contract between the employer and the farm labor
contractor, and therefore it is not technically a violation of the H-2
regulations. This provides a legal buffer for U.S. employers who fail

155.
156.
157.
158.

Id. § 1589(a).
Id. §§ 1589(a), 1595(a).
See supra Part III.C.2.
S. POVERTY LAW CTR., supranote 10, at 15; see supra Part III.C.2.

159.

S. POVERTY LAW CTR., supranote 10, at 15.

160.
See, e.g., United States v. Farrell, 563 F.3d 364, 376 (8th Cir. 2009) (citing
18 U.S.C. § 1592(a)) (noting that conviction for document servitude requires showing of
intent to withhold documents in violation of the peonage statute).
161.
S. POVERTY LAW CTR., supra note 10, at 9-10.
162.
Id. at 32-33.
163.
Id.
Id.
164.
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to meet the requirements of their contracts or the FLSA. Making
foreign recruiters and farm labor contractors amenable to U.S.
jurisdiction is extremely complicated and costly.1 65 Recruiters and
farm labor contractors also rarely have much money; effectively
"having a legal remedy against a farm labor contractor with no assets
is no remedy at all."166
A 2007 case demonstrates the ability of employers to use farm
labor contractors to avoid legal liability. Twelve Guatemalan
guestworkers filed the lawsuit. A farm labor contractor recruited the
guestworkers, telling them the job was in North Carolina planting
pine trees. 16 7 They arrived in the United States and the farm labor
contractor immediately sent them to Connecticut to work eighty-hour
weeks in nursery fields while living in a filthy apartment and earning
much less than the contract promised.168 Moreover, the U.S.
employer in Connecticut failed to pay the guestworkers for their
work. However, because the farm labor contractor employed the
workers, their only legal remedy was against the contractor.169 By
using a farm labor contractor's H-2 workers, the employer escaped
liability despite failing to pay the workers. 7 0 The difficulties
associated with bringing a case against farm labor contractors and
recruiters, discussed above, combined with the structure of the
program limiting the causes of action available to H-2A workers,
results in a "flawed program that encourages the private trafficking
of foreign workers with barely any government oversight."' 7 '
4.

Trafficking Violations Against H-2A Employers Are Difficult to
Prosecute Successfully

Under 18 U.S.C. § 1590, anyone who "knowingly recruits,
harbors, transports, provides or obtains by any means, any person for
labor or services" is in violation of § 1589 of the federal trafficking
statute.1 72 But, § 1595 gives victims a private right of action against
the violator.173 Typical violations include the seizure of passports
and documents in order to force labor and the luring of workers to the

165.
See Hearing, supra note 19, at 24-25 (prepared statement of Baldemar
Velasquez, Founder and President, Farm Labor Org. Comm.) (describing the
unscrupulous, unpunished behavior of many foreign recruiters and the difficulty in
controlling it).
166.
S. POVERTY LAW CTR., supranote 10, at 33.
167.
Id.
168.
Id.
169.
Id.
170.
Id.
171.
Id.
172.
18 U.S.C. § 1590 (2006).
173.
Id. § 1595.
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United States to work under false pretenses. 174 As discussed above,
recruiters usually commit the actual offense on behalf of the U.S.
employer. If the recruiter acts as the agent of the employer, both the
recruiter and employer are liable under the statute. 175 Proving
agency is challenging, however, because recruiters are difficult to
locate and are based in foreign countries. 176 Employers often hire
companies to find workers and those companies, in turn, hire local
recruiters.1 7 7 This distance makes it hard to prove that the employer
played an active role in misleading workers through employing
foreign recruiters, making false promises, or failing to provide written
contracts. The distance between the U.S. employer and the foreign
recruiter provides insulation from many potential trafficking claims.
Further, for reasons discussed above, lawyers are less likely to be
involved in the plight of guestworkers and, alone, the workers lack
the legal expertise to pursue complicated claims.' 7 8 "[A]s a practical
matter, workers .. . have an extremely difficult time finding a lawyer
willing to accept a case for a guestworker who will be required to
return to his or her home country."179 The trafficking statute permits
victims to apply for continued presence to serve as a witness to
prosecute the criminal trafficking claims. 8 0 If lawyers became
involved, it is possible that the workers' continued presence would
8
lead to more litigation of both trafficking and other civil claims.' '
Employers currently have every incentive to create distance
between themselves and the guestworkers they employ. The system
not only permits this distance, but facilitates it. The DOL simply has
not prevented this clever circumvention of the H-2 program rules.
Moreover, the structure of the program gives the employers too much
power even without such distance. Such a system naturally leads to
serious abuses. The H-2A workers' lack of access to the court system
further exacerbates the problem, removing an important incentive for
compliance by employers.1 82
Given the benefits they accrue,
employers are acting in their economic interest to the detriment of
guestworkers. The current program inadequately polices abuses and
does not incentivize fair treatment of workers. The structure of the
program binds workers to employers and jobs, regardless of the

174.

S. POVERTY LAW CTR., supra note 10, at 15-16.

See 18 U.S.C. § 1593A (extending liability to anyone who benefits from
175.
another's violation of 18 U.S.C. H§ 1581, 1592, 1595).
See supra Part III.C.3 (discussing the distance created between employers
176.
and perpetrators).
S. POVERTY LAW CTR., supra note 10, at 19-20, 32-33.
177.
Id. at 25-26.
178.
Id. at 26.
179.
22 U.S.C.A. § 7105(c)(3)(A)(i) (West 2010).
180.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1595 (2006) (creating a private cause of action for
181.
trafficking victims).
S. POVERTY LAW CTR., supra note 10, at 31.
182.
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employers' behavior, tipping the balance of power grossly.18 3
Meanwhile, U.S. farmworkers are not subjected to such treatment. 184
The disparate treatment of guestworkers reflects a general policy of
treating foreign workers as less valuable or less deserving, secondclass members of society. The way the DOL implemented the
program's rules and regulations reflects a willingness to use workers
for necessary labor without providing the protections that are assured
to U.S. citizens, a remnant of the bracero system.

IV. SOLUTION
The guestworker program radically changed immigration. 85 A
complex body of law, filled with loopholes and differing
interpretations, replaced the open border and free flow of labor that
once existed between Mexico and the United States. 186 This Note
demonstrates the failure of the current system; it is neither
protecting workers nor reducing the number of individuals working
illegally in the United States. A program that fails to serve its stated
purpose, while encouraging exploitative behavior on the part of
employers, cannot be justified. It needs to be amended or possibly
abolished.' 8 7 This Part discusses potential solutions to the most
egregious abuses guestworkers face in the United States.
A. EnhanceAccess to the Legal System
1.

Allow Legal Aid Attorneys to File Class Actions Against Farmers

Access to the legal system is the most critical component of
enforcing rights and protecting interests. Currently, H-2A workers
have very limited access and, due to practices such as blacklisting,
are often afraid to file claims.18 8 Employers with no fear of legal
consequences are unlikely to change economically beneficial
behavior. 8 9 Currently, very few lawyers provide free legal services to

183.
184.

Id. at 14.
U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, Chapter 3: Income and Poverty, in THE NATIONAL

AGRICULTURAL WORKERS SURVEY, http://www.doleta.gov/agworker/report/ch3.cfm (last
visited Sept. 26, 2010).

185.
See Ashby, supra note 29, at 899 (detailing the drastic changes to U.S.
immigration patterns upon the implementation of the guestworker program).
186.
See Baker, supra note 28, at 83 (describing lax enforcement of immigration
laws prior to the creation of the Bracero Program).
187.
See S. POVERTY LAW CTR., supra note 10, at 41-46 (arguing for major
alterations of the guestworker program).
188. Id. at 31.
189.
See id. (describing how the failure to enforce the laws perpetuates the
system of inequality).
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H-2A workers, and the majority are federally funded legal aid
attorneys.o9 0 Federally funded legal aid attorneys are not allowed to
bring class actions and are limited to bringing FLSA collective actions
against farmers that fail to pay large numbers of workers the
minimum wage.191 For breach of contract not amounting to an FLSA
violation, legal aid lawyers cannot file large class action cases even
though the cases sometimes involve large numbers of workers. 9 2
Allowing legal aid attorneys to bring class actions may have a
deterrent effect on employers. The fear of large-scale litigation alters
the cost-benefit analysis behind choosing to breach a standard
contract with a large number of guestworkers. Class action lawsuits
may garner more publicity, while drawing attention to the horrific
experiences of some workers at the hands of employers. Further,
workers fearing retaliation and blacklisting may feel more confident
and comfortable bringing a class action lawsuit as opposed to acting
alone. 9 3 Permitting class actions allows many to benefit from one or
two brave workers willing to appear as a named plaintiff representing
a group. 194
2.

Allow Workers to Remain in the United States to Prosecute
Their Claims

The INA should include a provision permitting guestworkers
with a prima facie employment case against their H-2A or H-2B
employer to be eligible for a special visa. This visa will permit them
to remain in the United States while their case is pending. Class
actions may even prove lucrative in some cases, especially if H-2A
workers become included in the MSPA umbrella, which provides for
damages, or if the workers have FLSA claims, which permit treble
damages in some instances. Private attorneys do not have the same
restrictions as legal aid attorneys, but are generally unwilling to take
cases of workers who will have to return to their country of origin and
will not be in the United States to prosecute their claims. 195 Giving
guestworkers meaningful access to the legal system requires
permitting them to live and work in the United States for the
duration of their case. This will encourage litigation of these claims.

190.
Id. at 18.
191.
Id. at 30.
192.
See id. at 28-31 (detailing the inability of legal aid lawyers to bring a class
action suit and the widespread abuse of migrant workers).
193.
Id. at 30 ("Given the workers' enormous fears of retaliation and
blacklisting, any system that relies on workers asserting their own legal rights is
unlikely to bring about systematic change.").
Id. at 30-31 ("Having access to class action litigation would at least permit
194.
cases to be brought by one or two workers brave enough to challenge the system.").
Id. at 26.
195.
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A potential criticism of this approach is that it could incentivize
workers to fabricate claims in order to receive a more favorable
status. To prevent fraud, the DOL should serve as a filter by
investigating the claims to determine whether workers qualify for
this special visa. If the claims are without merit, they will not be
approved. This visa forces the DOL to perform investigations it is
already obligated to perform under the statute.
3.

Hold Employers Liable for the Actions of Recruiters and Farm
Labor Contractors

Currently, many employers are able to avoid liability by creating
artificial distance between themselves and guestworkers by hiring
middlemen in the form of recruiters and farm labor contractors.
Consequently, the recruiters and the farm labor contractors become
the principal violators against whom guestworkers must bring their
action. These parties are often insolvent, not amenable to suit in the
United States, and are not the principal causes of the problem.196
This scapegoating perpetuates exploitation. 9 7
In order to combat this decentralization, employers should be
held strictly liable for the actions of recruiters and farm labor
contractors that provide workers to them. Agency theory leaves too
much ambiguity and allows employers to avoid punishment; a brightline rule will force employers to take action against unfair
recruitment practices. A clear rule establishing liability, regardless
of the amount of contact between the parties, is necessary to
incentivize employers to ensure that workers are treated fairly
throughout the process. The burden should be placed on employers
because they are regulated by and benefitting from the H-2A
program.' 98
Once employers are strictly liable for the actions of recruiters
and farm labor contractors, it will be much easier for guestworkers
that are the victims of trafficking to establish criminal violations of
the trafficking statute.1 99 This statute includes a provision allowing
for a "continued presence" visa for those victims remaining in the
country to serve as witnesses in the case. The holder of this visa is
eligible to work legally in the United States. This visa can also serve

196.
See id. at 33 ("Having a legal remedy against a labor contractor with no
assets is no remedy at all.").
197.
Id.
198.
See Arriaga v. Fla. Pac. Farms, 305 F.3d 1228, 1237 (11th Cir. 2002)
(discussing the benefits employers accrue).
199.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1592 (2006) (stating that any person who holds another's
immigration document in violation of the forced labor provisions is liable under the
trafficking statute).
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as a model for any visa extended to H-2 workers pursuing legal
claims.
4.

Improve Department of Labor Investigations

The DOL is not doing an adequate job ensuring that only
deserving employers are certified. Investigating more thoroughly
before problems arise prevents abuse and limits the number of claimrelated visas needed to pursue court claims. A more diligent, betterstaffed DOL can enforce the minimal protections offered by the
current statute, a critical first step in improving the actual situation
of guestworkers. Additional changes could improve the DOL's access
to information at minimal cost. The DOL could require employers to
make a full report to the DOL of workers' hours and wages. This
report could be made under penalty of perjury and serve as a starting
point for hunting abusive employers.
B. Amend the Law to Better Protect Guestworkers
1.

Do Not Bind H-2 Workers to a Single Employer

The balance of power between H-2A workers and their employers
is tilted towards employers, making it impossible for workers to
protect themselves, because they are bound to one employer for the
duration of their contract. 200 If a worker leaves the employer, he
loses his legal status. 201 If an employer is abusive or fails to provide
the wages or hours promised, the guestworker must choose between
three bad options: going home early and not recouping his costs,
remaining with the abusive employer, or working for another U.S.
employer illegally. If the worker is caught "off visa," or out of status,
the worker faces a five-year bar from participation in the H-2A
program. 20 2
The free labor market can police the practices of employers.
Guestworkers should receive time-based, rather than employerbased, visas. Allowing guestworkers to participate in a free labor
market may curb many of the abuses they currently face. Employers
would not wield as much power over guestworkers if the
guestworkers could leave and find other work without potential legal
and immigration problems. Under this visa, employers that do not
breach their contract could bring action against guestworkers that
leave without reason for breach of the contract. On the other hand,
when an employer breaches a contract, the guestworker would be free

200.
201.

See supra note 141 and accompanying text.

202.

8 U.S.C. § 1188(f) (2006).

See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
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to leave and seek employment elsewhere. This change will shift the
allocation of power and achieve greater parity between employer and
guestworker. At the same time, the visas could still be limited
temporally to ensure that the H-2A permit does not become an
immigrant visa and remains a non-immigrant work permit.
2.

Hold Employers Liable for the Expenses Incurred Procuring
Employment and Traveling to the United States

Congress should amend the guestworker program and require
employers to bear the costs guestworkers incur procuring
employment, such as fees to recruiters, visa costs, as well as the cost
of traveling to the United States. Such costs are for the "benefit or
convenience of the employer" and incidental to the recruitment
program. Therefore, the employer should reimburse workers for
these costs. 203 Employers chose to participate in the H-2 program;
recruitment and transportation are necessary conditions of that
program. 204
If the law forces employers to pay for recruitment fees, it will
incentivize employers to ensure those fees are fair and reasonable.
Interpreting recruitment fees to be for the benefit of the employer will
lead to better policing of the most egregious, expensive, and
exploitative recruitment practices. This will reduce the need for the
DOL to investigate practices in foreign countries by putting the onus
on the employer. It will encourage employers to work only with
responsible recruiters and to make certain that their workers are not
paying unnecessary fees prior to arriving in the United States.
Lowered costs at the outset will permit workers to arrive in the
United States with fewer debts and obligations. Guestworkers with
fewer debts can leave bad jobs without worrying about returning
home to face a mountain of debt. An amendment requiring employers
to pay these costs helps increase the power of the guestworker vis-Avis his employer, narrowing the disparity in the balance of power
currently permitting employers to behave unjustly.
3.

Force Employers to Fulfill 100 Percent of Their Contract

Currently, guestworkers are only guaranteed three-fourths of
their promised contract. 205 This stipulation encourages employers to

Arriaga v. Fla. Pac. Farms, 305 F.3d 1228, 1237-43 (11th Cir. 2002) (citing
203.
29 CFR § 531.32(c)) (holding employers responsible for cost of transportation and visas,
but not recruiting fees).
See id. at 1241-46 (noting that transportation is necessary, but declining to
204.
characterize recruiting fees, instead deciding the issue on the grounds of lack of
agency).
20 C.F.R. § 655.122(i) (2010).
205.
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exaggerate in their offers of employment, promising more hours and
money than they can give.20 6 Workers are often unable to pay their
debts without receiving the full value of their contract. 207 Forcing
employers to pay the entire contract price will force them to assess
more realistically the amount of work they have available, how many
workers they need, and how much they can pay guestworkers. This
additional information will permit workers to make better decisions
regarding whether or not coming to the United States on an H-2
employment contract is a financially sound decision; they will know
the exact value of the contract.
4.

Extend the Agricultural Worker Protection Act to Cover H-2A
Workers

As discussed above, leaving protection of H-2A workers to state
contract law and the FLSA insufficiently protects against wage theft,
poor housing conditions, document servitude, and other abuses. 20 8
The APWA is another legal mechanism that should enforce all H-2
contracts; it provides punitive civil remedies for employer abuses
based on their severity and number. 209 Extending the MSPA will
increase the value of each H-2A lawsuit, making the cases more
attractive to private attorneys. The involvement of private attorneys
is crucial for enhancing guestworkers' access to the court system as
legal aid services are incapable of handling the magnitude and
complexity of many of the cases.2 10 If the MSPA covered H-2A
workers, many of their cases would become very profitable for private
attorneys. 211 The risk of defending against a large-scale lawsuit may
also serve as a deterrent to those employers that do not treat their
workers well.
V. CONCLUSION

The situation of many migrant agricultural guestworkers,
working legally in the United States through the H-2A program, is
abysmal.
Faced with wage theft, horrible housing conditions,
dangerous working conditions, and breaches of contract,

206.
S. POVERTY LAW CTR., supra note 10, at 9-10.
207.
Id.
208.
See supra Part III (discussing the problems guestworkers encounter).
209.
Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act §§ 501, 503, 29
U.S.C. §§ 1851, 1853 (2006).
210.
See S. POVERTY LAW CTR., supra note 10, at 30-31 (describing the
difficulties that migrant workers face in obtaining legal representation).
211.
See 29 U.S.C. § 1854 (authorizing private rights of action for violations of
the MSPA).
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guestworkers have limited access to the court system and few
remedies available. Unlike their American counterparts whom the
MSPA and free market help to protect, H-2A workers have few
remedies available and are much more vulnerable. Few lawyers are
willing to take their cases and few politicians are willing to stand up
for them. Existing legislation fails to protect guestworkers from even
egregious exploitation, and the existing regulations often perpetuate
the power imbalance between employer and guestworker by
strengthening the position of the employer and weakening the
guestworkers' ability to change their situation. Guestworkers work
in conditions that U.S. workers cannot even imagine. Due to the
MSPA, the ability to leave bad jobs and seek other similar
employment, and increased ability to procure legal representation,
U.S. workers do not have to endure such situations. Unlike domestic
farmworkers, guestworkers have difficulty communicating with and
accessing attorneys, and also cannot simply leave a bad employer for
another without potentially huge repercussions, such as failing to
recover their costs or working illegally, "out-of-status." This disparity
between domestic and foreign workers is an embarrassment to the
United States and a gross miscarriage of justice.
Employers are taking
The old bracero attitude prevails.
and exploiting
available
is
work
when
labor
advantage of cheap
guestworkers when it is not; the individual guestworkers are
disposable. Given the magnitude of the problem and the failure of
existing laws to remedy it, Congress needs to step in and amend the
statute. Legislation must strengthen the protections of workers. It
must increase the potential remedies and improve access to justice.
To do this, the entire program should be changed. Without amending
the statute, guestworkers will continue suffering silently.
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